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SENATOR ALBERT B. FALL AND
"THE PLOT AGAINST MEXICO"

MARK T. CILDllRHUS

IN 1919 a curious assortment of journalists, radicals, and missionaries charged "the interests" with undertaking "a plot against
Mexico." Allegedly Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico and
American oil producers were seeking military intervention against
the government of Venustiano Carranza. Although Fall and the
oil men denied the accusation, most-scholarly authorities have accepted the substance of the charge as valid. The existing literature
portrays the Senator as an interventionist who sought to resolve
the crisis with Mexico during the autumn of 1919 by means of
force. 1 This essay seeks to suggest that his goals were in fact less
direct.
Albert Fall had a reputation for toughness in Mexican affairs.
After winning election to the Senate as a Republican in 1912, he
embraced American businessmen as his special constituents and
assailed Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policies for lacking direction
and authority. As a pugnacious politico and entrepreneur with
close ties to borderland enterprise, Fall identified with Americans
in Mexico. 2 In 1919 his personal concerns complemented those of
his party. Having won control of Congress in 1918, Republicans
mounted an assault against the Wilson administration with a view
toward forthcoming presidential elections. Although they directed
much of their fire against the Treaty of Versailles, the Mexican
question also figured in their ·calculations. Senator Fall presided
over this aspect of the attack and developed an intimate association
with American oil producers in Mexico. In February 1919 Harold
Walker, a spokesman for Edward L. Doheny's Mexican Petroleum
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Company, appealed to Fall for assistance. While attributing Mexico's "hideous" condition largely "to Mr. Wilson's able assistance,"
Walker urged the Senator to speak out, because only he could,
give to the issue the necessary "dramatic presentation."3 Subsequently, in efforts to toughen American policy, Fall collaborated
with various oil men and aided the National Association for the
Protection of American Rights in Mexico.
American businessmen created the National Association early in
December 1918. Fronted by a twelve-member committee with
offices in New York City, the organization represented a variety of
concerns, including land and cattle companies, mining operations,
and petroleum enterprises. It functioned primarily as a pressure
group and publicity bureau which sought to discredit Venustiano
Carranza with charges of negligence and malfeasance. As its principal goal, the National Association intended to arouse, organize,
and lead "a public sentiment" to sustain the United States government "in taking without further delay whatever steps may be
necessary to secure . . . protection for the lives and property of
Americans in Mexico."4
Assisted by Senator Fall, the National Association singled out
for special censure Carranza's inability to pacify the republic and
his challenge to the sanctity of private property. Propaganda releases depicted Mexico as having regressed into a Hobbesian state
of barbarity. Lawlessness and disorder threatened constantly.Bandits, marauders, and venal officials subjected United States nationals to repeated indignities, and government authorities, either
indifferent or powerless, did nothing. The new Mexican Constitution of February 5, 1917, also rankled. This document, an expression of economic nationalism, was intended to provide greater
control over foreign business operations in the extractive industries. Article Twenty-seven especially threatened American interests. It asserted "the right to impose on private property such
limitations as the public interest may demand," and sanctioned
expropriation "for reasons of public utility and by means of indemnification." It also annulled the practices of Porfirio Diaz by
re-establishing the Hispanic tradition of vesting ownership of
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mineral resources with the nation. Since possession of surface
lands no longer would imply title to resources beneath the surface,
exploitative concessions in the future could be obtained only by
direct concession from the Mexican government. 5
Article Twenty-seven did not affect that status of property rights
immediately. Enacting legislation was necessary to make it effective, but Americans nevertheless objected strenuously. Oil men,
especially, interpreted the provision as a confiscatory device. To
constitute "a united front," they formed the Oil Producers Association with Edward 1. Doheny as chairman, and urged the United
States governmentto defend their property energetically.6
In 1917 and 1918 Woodrow Wilson had subordinated Mexican
issues to the task of waging war against Germany. Although the
State Department warned repeatedly that the United States would
not acquiesce in "the direct or indirect confiscation of Americanowned property," the President wished to avoid a confrontation
while engaged in Europe, and American property owners tended
to regard his efforts as excessively timid. Nevertheless, it was
widely assumed that the United States would call Carranza to
account once the European struggle ended. As a State Department
memorandum observed in August 1918, "a policy of temporization" toward Mexico was necessary for the duration, but "immediately" after "the European peace," the United States should
undertake "the rehabilitation of Mexico."7
In spite of such expectations, Wilson did not move to reorient
United States Mexican policies drastically, and,State Department
officials cautioned repeatedly during the spring and summer of
1919 against a possible upsurge of interventionist sentiment. In
March for example, Henry P. Fletcher, the American ambassador
to Mexico, warnea that the administration could "let matters drift
in their present unsatisfactory condition," but to do so would risk
"the ensuing clamor at home and abroad."8 The outcry grew
steadily louder. Late in June one oil executive declared to the State
Department that "the time for action has arrived." The National
Association made similar demands in the Bulletin, a propaganda
organ which asserted the need for an early remedy.. On July 9
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spokesmen for eighteen petroleum corporations conferred with
State Department officials, and some of the oil men were favorably
disposed toward intervention. In the same month Republicans in
the House of Representatives took up the issue by inquiring into
Mexican affairs and criticizing the administration's handling of
them. 9
In the meantime, Americans in sympathy with the Mexican
Revolution mounted a counterattack. It was spearheaded by the
League of Free Nations Association, an organization founded after
the European armistice to promote international peace and friendship. Directed by Dr. Samuel Guy Inman, a missionary-scholar
and an authority on Latin America, the group's committee on
Mexico tried to defend Carranza and advised against forceful
measures. In addition, radical journalists such as John Kenneth
Turner, Leander J. de Bekker, and Arthur Thomson wrote
treatises in which they attacked the National Association and accused the oil men of plotting military action against Mexico. 10
Albert B. Fall confronted these charges directly during the autumn
of 1919 when he presided over a Senate investigation of Mexican
affairs.
Assisted by Frank B. Brandegee, a Republican from Connecticut, and Marcus Smith, a Democrat from Arizona, Senator
Fall initiated the inquiry on September 8, 1919. During the following months, the committee summoned 257 witnesses, of whom
52 appeared in executive session, and compiled a report consisti~g
of 3,400 pages of published testimony. Fall dominated the hearings. Although he disclaimed any personal stake in Mexico and
professed friendship for the Mexican people, he conducted the
investigation in a partisan fashion from the outset. His sympathies clearly resided with disgruntled Americans who were
hostile toward Carranza. 11
When Samuel Guy Inman, Leander J. de Bekker, and Arthur
Thomson appeared to defend the Mexican Revolution, Fall gave
them little credence. Each maintained that the National Association in cooperation with Doheny and the oil producers was conspiring to bring about military intervention in Mexico. Moreover,
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each suggested that Senator Fall had .aided and abetted the
scheme. 12 The Senator, in response, baited and bullied his critics,
and in the end managed to undermine their credibility. He insisted upon convincing proof, not mere inference, and the witnesses
could not provide it. While chiding Arthur Thomson about the
dubious veracity of his sources, for example, Fall lamented:' "It is
a wheel within a wheel. You get something from Mr. De Bekker
. . . and you swing it around, and then Mr. De Bekker gets something from you, and he swings it around, and that is the way it
goes on." Condescendingly, he recommended some historical
studies of Mexico to alleviate Thomson's ignorance. 13
Fall then introduced a number of oil men, most notably Mr.
Doheny, his friend and former partner, Charles H. Boynton, the
executive secretary of the National Association, Frederick Kellogg,
an attorney employed by Doheny, Amos L. Beatty, the general
counsel for the Texas Company, and William F. Buckley, a
spokesmen for independent oil producers. They complained pro.fusely about conditions in Mexico, and proposed a variety of solutions. All favored a more assertive policy, but none advocated
armed intervention, except as a last resort. Most shared the view
of George Agnew Chamberlain, a former American consul general
in Mexico City, who advised a policy of graduated. pressure.
Diplomatic recognition should be withdrawn from the Carranza
government. Then, if necessary, the United States should place an
embargo on all loans, close all avenues of commerce, utilize naval
demonstrations, and cooperate with anti-Carranza rebels who
seemed likely to treat American property more generously. Finally,
but only if everything else failed, Washington should consider the
possibility of using force. 14
Senator Fall believed in the efficacy of a similar course. Contrary
to the prevailing view, his primary goal in 1919 was not military
intervention. He preferred a more subtle, indirect method. By
discrediting the Mexican President and withdrawing diplomatic
support from him, Fall hoped to precipitate a rebellion among
anti-Carranza groups and to establish a new government in power.
The Senator attempted to stigmatize President Carranza in a
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number of ways. For example, Fall tried to link Carranza with
radiCal and subversive elements in the United States. In a letter to
Secretary of State Robert Lansing in the middle of November,
Fall alleged that the Mexican President had fostered sedition in
the United States. As evidence, he disclosed that Mexican consulates were distributing Arthur Thomson's Th~ Conspiracy
Against Mexico, a pamphlet which Fall dubbed "A Bolshevi;ki
appeal to labor elements in the United States." In addition, Fall
reported that Carranza had assisted Senora Hermila Galindo in
the preparation of a book which castigated the northern colossus
for its pretensions of hegemony in the hemisphere and upheld
Pan-Hispanicism as an ideal. In the Senator's view, it clearly
demonstrated Carranza's hostile attitude. As further proof, Fall's
committee tried to implicate President Carranza in a plot reportedly
calculated to provoke an uprising among Mexicans in the American Southwest. 15 Such charges were especially potent during the
era of the Red Scare. By insisting upon a connection between the
revolution in Mexico and social unrest at home, Fall exploited
America's postwar paranoia and won ever more support. Ambassador Fletcher moved closer to Fall's position. So did Secretary of
the Interior Franklin K. Lane, and Robert Lansing also became
increasingly sympathetic. 16
Albert Fall expected that anti-Carranza factions would coalesce
into a solid bloc of opposition if the United States would withdraw
recognition from Carranza. A resurgence of rebel activities in 19 I 9
buoyed his hopes. In the north and sou~ alike, leaders such as
Francisco Villa, Emiliano Zapata, and Felix Diaz were appealing
for the creation of a new revolutionary union. Fall's strategem
focused especially on Felix Diaz. As a nephew of former President
Pornrio Diaz and a favorite among Mexican conservatives, he had
a high regard for the sanctity of private property. Moreover, as chief
of the Ejercito Reorganizador Nacional (National Army of Reorganization), he wielded considerable influence in southern Mexico, and sought to extend it by cultivating ties with rebels such as
Guillermo Meixueiro, who had established an autonomous regime
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in Oaxaca, and Manuel Pelaez, who controlled the oil fields around
Tampico and Veracruz. 17
.
To amalgamate the anti-Carrancistas into a single force, it· was
necessary to overcome a multitude of differences, but gradually the
movement gained headway. In 1919 Carranza's principal enemies
affirmed allegiance to the Constitution of 1857. In contrast to the
Constitution of 1917, this ,document upheld more vigorously the
right to own property. By repudiating Article Twenty-seven, the
anti-Carrancistas intended to court support north of the border. By
recognizing their status as belligerents, they proclaimed, Washington could avoid the responsibility of intervention and facilitate "a
quick and sound reconstruction of Mexico."IS
Rebel groups of course viewed Albert Fall as a potential ally. At
least by the late summer of I 9 I 9, intermediaries had placed him in
contact with Pedro del Villar, the leader of the Diaz exiles in the
United States. In August, in a memorandum addressed to the·
Senator, Villar requested support and recognition for Diaz. A few
weeks later, in an appeal to the State Department, anti-Carrancistas promised "to unite in the formation of a provisional administration." To aid in this "great work of reconstruction," they
"frankly" asked for American assistance. 19 An opportunity to obtain it appeared a short while later when a crisis developed over
"h
J k'IllS a ff'"
teen
mr.
William O. Jenkins, an American consular agent in the city of
Puebla, was abducted on the night of October 19, 19 I 9, by a band
of rebels, probably acting on orders from Manuel Pelaez. To embarrass Mexico City and to p~ovoke an incident with the United
States, they demanded a ransom of three hundred thousand pesos,
payable only by the Mexican government. The plan went awry,
however, when Jenkins fell ill. Rather than risk his death, the kidnappers accepted payment from private sources, and released the;
victim on October 26. Officials in the state ofPuebla then arrested
Jenkins, charging that he had arranged his own abduction in collusion with the insurgents. Claiming innocence, Jenkins refused
to post bail on.grounds that it would amount to a.tacit admission of
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guilt. 20 The incident soon became a cause celebre in the United
States.
Since a stroke had incapacitated President Wilson early in October, Secretary Lansing took charge. He and most members of the
Cabinet favored caution, although Franklin K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior, and Albert S. Burleson, the PostmasterGeneral, urged "drastic measures," and Henry Fletcher advised
"a strong position." Indeed, Fletcher wanted to break off relations
unless Mexico released Jenkins within forty-eight hours. Initially
Lansing would not go that far, but he proceeeded to lay "all the
cards on the table." In a note to Mexico City on November 23, he
criticized Jenkins' arrest, calling it "entirely unwarranted" and "an
arbitrary exercise of public authority." Failure to release the
prisoner, he warned, would "have a very serious effect." Fletcher,
in the meantime, reported that the Army and Navy stood ready.21
When Mexico refused to free Jenkins three days later, the Secretary of State furiously called the Mexican ambassador to account
for the "insolence" of his government. He told Ignacio Bonillas
that the United States had suffered "indignity after indignity" and
would tolerate no more. An open break was possible unless Carranza abandoned his policy of "Ragrant disregard for American
rights." Moreover, public outrage "might overwhelm" diplomatic
efforts, and that "would almost inevitably mean war." Bonillas was
rendered speechless. As Lansing later recalled with satisfaction, the
ambassador terminated the conversation abruptly by stalking out
"white with rage."22
In a second dispatch on the following day, the Secretary of State
accused the Carranza government of "wilful indifference to the
feelings of the American people," and again requested Jenkins'
release. His note had the earmarks of a near ultimatum, but
Lansing nevertheless seemed opposed to military action. In his
diary, he explained that he wanted to resolve the crisis peacefully,
but worried lest Carranza's behavior might provoke "a storm of
popular indignation" in the United States. By assuming a forceful
stance, Lansing hoped to deRate interventionist pressure. As he
saw it, the outburst against Bonillas was "a last resort to get the
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Mexicans to change their policy and prevent an explosion in Congress." Though bellicose and threatening, "it really was intended
to. prevent war."23
.Lansing's maneuver, whatever his intentions, provided Carranza's enemies with an opportunity to exploit. In a note to Senator
Fall on November 28, a spokesman for Felix Diaz suggested an
alliance with the United States. In return for aid and support, the
insurgents would deed Lower California to the United States after
taking power, and would allow the Americans "full control of all
petroleum fields in Mexico."24 In the meantime, Senator Fall
hurried back to Washington· from El Paso. When he arrived on
December I, the Secretary of State designated Henry Fletcher to
brief him. Subsequently Fall told Fletcher of his decision to initiate congressional action. He intended to introduce a resolution in
the Senate to support the State Department's handling of the
Jenkins case and to urge a break in relations with Mexico. 25
Upon learning of the plan, Lansing in dismay ordered Fletcher
to dissuade Senator Fall. The Secretary feared that such a resolutionwol;lld cripple efforts to settle the crisis peacefully, especially
since two days previously Ignacio Bonillas had confided his belief
that Jenkins would be released. On December 4, Lansing and
Fletcher appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and asked it to defer action. The Secretary, however, inadvertently heightened speculation about the President's ability to
perform his duties when he confessed that he had not informed
Wilson of developments in Mexico. Republican members in response urged an inquiry, and arranged an audience with the
President for Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, a Democrat from
Nebraska, and Senator Albert B. Fall. 26
The details of the visitation on the afternoon of December 5 are
well known. Scarcely the mindless lunatic conjured up by rumor,
the President was cheerful, alert, and in control of his faculties.
Moreover, the denouement of the Jenkins affair took place during
the interview when news arrived that Carranza had decided to free
his captive. This act relieved the immediate crisis, but Wilson
nevertheless asked Fall to prepare a memorandum on Mexico. The
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Senator still wanted to revoke recognition, but Wilson was unpersuaded. He would neither sanction a break nor consent to
congressional action on Fall's proposal. As he phrased it, "I would
be gravely concerned to see any such resolution pass the Congress."27 A rebuke by the President thus frustrated Senator Fall's
ambition, and the scheme to overthrow Carranza by triggering a
revolution against him came to naught.
So what of "the plot against Mexico?" The evidence suggests
that something resembling a plot did exist. A diffuse, loosely connected aggregation including unhappy property owners, dissident
government officials, and insurgent anti-Carrancistas shared a
common disdain for the Mexican President. Some hoped to force
a change in his policies, others to eliminate him altogether. But
beyond this vague coincidence of interest, they could agree upon
little, especially upon means by which to achieve their goals. Their
endeavors as a consequence lacked coherence and coordination.
Only Senator Fall's presence brought a sense of unity and purpose
to the efforts of otherwise disparate groups.
Although Fall was the central figure, it is misleading to portray
him primarily as an advocate of military intervention in 1919. Such
a view misses the essential subtlety of his purpose. He knew the
difficulty of persuading President Wilson to send troops into
Mexico. He understood also the inherent danger of military action.
It could create new threats to American interests in Mexico, and
might cause Carranza's rivals to rally in defense of the motherland
against a foreign invader. All things considered, Fall thought it
wise to pursue his goal indirectly. He correctly perceived the precarious instability of the Carranza regime, but miscalculated by
counting on Felix Diaz and his allies. In May 1920 an uprising
overthrew Carranza and led to his assassination. But in contrast to
the Senator's expectations, it was precipitated by a factional feud
from within the Carranza coalition: And the new rulers of MexicoAlvaro Obregon, Plutarco ElIas Calles, and Adolfo de la Huerta
-were no more satisfactory to Albert B. Fall than Venustiano
Carranza. 28
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